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Acciones al portador, lo que está en juego

By Eduardo Morgan Jr.

Published on La Prensa

April 19, 2013

The controversy raised around the bill that intended to immobilize bearer shares has left in the community the impression that the attorneys who opposed the bill defend personal interests that were contrary to those of the bankers who supported its approval.

Nothing is further from the truth. Quite the contrary. The immobilization and subsequent custody of bearer shares may have represented an important additional income for law firms, such as the one I represent, because it would have allowed us to charge for a new service to customers, whose bearer shares we would guard. Notwithstanding, the only interest we seek is to defend Panama as the international service center it has become, of which the banking sector is the most important piece.  Let me explain myself.

As has been proven over and over again by reading the original documents published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its global forum (see Peer Review Report Phase 1 Legal and Regulatory Framework Panama), the immobilization of bearer shares is only one of several requirements included in the guidebook created by them, whereby, noncompliance would motivate the inclusion of  “offender” countries on a blacklist that would put over their heads the Damocles’ sword of strong sanctions.

Another demand is the requirement that all companies listed in our Public Registry keep ledgers detailing their operations, even if these operations are carried out outside of Panama, which would begin to crack the tax system based on territoriality. But the requirement that completes the Global Forum’s menu, and that could derail the banking center, is the one that would force Panama to sign agreements to exchange tax information with any country that requires it. Inexplicably, the bankers do not want to see the enormous danger that this requirement represents. To understand the full extent, just read the study published last month by the Superintendence of Banks where it is clear that 38% of our bank deposits come from countries in the region such as Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and others and not from OECD country members.

If Panama submits to such requirements and sign tax information exchange agreements to avoid being included in the Global Forum’s blacklist we can kiss the banking center goodbye! The mere suspicion that this could happen would be enough to cause a withdrawal of funds from those who have trusted in the privacy laws that have regulated our banking system for more than 40 years. It is necessary to emphasize that privacy is not synonymous with anonymity and money laundering, as some seem to think. Privacy is a sacred individual right in all democratic constitutions in the world, one to which sometimes people who may be victims of political persecution, family disputes or offenses against their freedom must resort to.

This reality explains the inalienable fight of those who oppose the bearer shares bill. We are not only defending the integrity of the law of corporations, immovable cornerstone of our service economy. No. Indeed we defend, above all, the survival of our financial center, whose elimination is the real objective of the OECD. Since globalization and technological development have allowed for the development of financial centers beyond the borders of the richest countries that make up this group, these countries have worked to prevent the emergence of any center that may compete with London, New York or Miami. This is not only my opinion, it has also been stated, without any hint of shame or subterfuge, by the OECD itself in the document Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes, paragraphs 36 and 37.

What should we do, against the threats of the OECD and the Global Forum? I start by noting that the fundamental difference between those who support the bill that aims to immobilize bearer shares and those who oppose is that we do believe that Panama has more than fulfilled its obligation of transparency in all that relates to international transactions. We have exemplary laws that require lawyers who incorporate companies to know their customer, which makes the issue of bearer shares irrelevant, and have signed a number of international agreements that allow national authorities at the request of a foreign authority, to investigate and determine if there is money in our banking center which comes from criminal acts.

If Panama has already complied, then there is no reason to bow before the OECD. Supporters of the project rely on the assumption that the powerful countries can impose whatever they want and the small countries have no choice but to obey. They cite the example of what has happened in the British Virgin Islands, Bahamas and Belize. They forget, however, that we are neither a British colony, nor Bahamians or Belizeans. We Panamanians, inhabit a nation that has over 500 years of history and that today, after tackling the most powerful country on Earth, has regained its Canal and its geographical position, reason why today it is a leader in economic development in the region. What to do then? Simply face the OECD and any of its satellites, to reach, through a real negotiating process and without an inferiority complex, what other generations of Panamanians have achieved supported by reason and fairness.

¿Dónde están los trillones?

By Eduardo Morgan Jr.

Published on La Estrella

April 17, 2013

 

The world press has circulated with great prominence, which has also been echoed by our media, the news that a group of journalists based in Washington under the sonorous name of Consortium of Investigative Journalists has access to 2 million e-mails and other documents from the British Virgin Islands. These documents name millionaires, officials, political leaders, dictators and their families, from five continents. The news highlight that the value of fortunes hidden in BVI and other tax havens exceeds the astronomical sum of 32 trillion dollars. What investigative journalists do not explain is in what countries are those trillions. No one can believe that the tiny BVI or other tax havens may have in their banks or economy that huge sum. Because of the seriousness of the organization they represent we should expect this investigation to continue to give us insights into the countries that give refuge to such wealth, largely ill-gotten or hiding their tax obligations.

 

We think it will not be difficult to find the bearers of these fortunes. All countries, particularly the richest in Europe and the U.S. have strict laws against money laundering and, as it is in the case of Panama, its banks and trustees are required to know their customers and to find out the source of the money.  There are studies from recognized organizations on non-resident deposits and compliance with the rules of transparency with emphasis on understanding the client to precisely prevent money laundering. Investigative journalists can start with the excellent study “Privately held non-resident deposits in secrecy jurisdictions” dated March 10, 2010 and authored by Ann Hollingshead. This research was conducted with funding from the Ford Foundation. This study can be consulted on the Internet. From its content we extract the following information:

 

 The study is part of the Global Financial Integrity program that focuses on the transnational movement of illicit funds. Their sources are the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund and central banks in international financial centers. It is clarified that in the context of the study the connotation “secret jurisdiction” has a broader picture of countries that the traditional definition of offshore financial centers. The study identifies that there are about 10 trillion dollars from these funds; the U.S. is in first place with $2 trillion, the UK and the Cayman Islands are in second and third respectively with about $ 1.5 trillion each. Private deposits of non-residents are defined as deposits belonging to private individuals or corporations from another jurisdiction.

 

The term “secret jurisdiction” is defined as: “Places that intentionally established regulations for the benefit and use of non-residents in their geographical domain. These regulations are intended to affect legislation or regulation from another jurisdiction. To facilitate its use, secret jurisdictions also provide a veil of secrecy that ensures that non-residents who use them can not be identified”.

It also notes that the United States, with the largest economy in the world, is the first in the secret jurisdictions’ index and also the one that cooperates the least with other jurisdictions. The Cayman Islands occupy the 4th place and the UK the 5th.

 

To find information about the investment destination investigative journalists will not have to “hack” BVI mails nor “invent” that they have penetrated our Public Registry (where, as it is known, you can enter through the front door and the information is public for all).  They will only have to log into the Internet and find the excellent studies and investigations of UN agencies and the U.S. government and also access the studies of the GAO (Government Accountability Office), and Senate hearings and FinCEN, which serves as a financial police for the U.S. Treasury Department and similar organizations. Without difficulty they could make an inventory of the places where big crooks from some third world countries and corrupt officials from developed countries hide or display their enormous fortunes. And likewise, discover and publicize the laws and practices of “secrecy jurisdictions” and thus help the public opinion in these countries and the world to blame and shame them for these practices. To achieve this, it is necessary for all countries to come together to end so much hypocrisy which only affects the harmonious development of society.

(English) GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY: Privately Held,Non-Resident Deposits in Secrecy Jurisdictions

By Ann Hollingshead 

March 2010

https://sites.morimor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2010/10/Global-Financial-Integrity.pdf

 

(English) Jason Sharman replies to criticism on his paper “Panama’s Corporation System and Bearer Shares in Comparative Perspective”

Jason Sharman

The comments below respond to and seek to rebut criticisms made of my above-mentioned paper. Unfortunately the criticisms strongly give the impression that the reviewer has no interest in genuinely engaging with the argument and evidence presented (and hence the willful misinterpretations and evasions), but only wants to present the impression of having an open mind on the matters discussed. Thus while I am sure my response below will make no impression at all on the reviewer, I am hopeful they might persuade an impartial reader who has some regard for logical arguments based on facts.

I begin by summarising the main criticisms made of my paper in italics, doing my best to faithfully reproduce the core of the reviewer’s argument (a standard courtesy not extended to my paper by the reviewer).

1. The ‘Level Playing Field’ argument is ‘old fashioned’, in that the paper avoids the question of whether Panama meets the standards by just saying Panama is better than others. The US and UK reports have been approved by the whole Global Forum, and thus meet the standards.

As discussed in the paper, equal treatment of all Global Forum participants is absolutely critical to the Global Forum exercise, for both reasons of fairness and efficacy. It is a basic principle of justice that like cases be treated in a like manner. Previously, however, the OECD has employed a double standard whereby both in terms of process and outcomes members were treated more favourably than non-members, as even the OECD admits in its more candid moments. Its current treatment of Panama relative to more powerful states raises similar worries of double standards. The ‘Level Playing Field’ argument was used prior to 2009 by some countries as an excuse for inaction until every other country had taken action. This is not at all the Panamanian position, given the practical action taken on beneficial ownership already, which in important respects is more effective than that of important OECD member states.

Leaving aside questions of fairness and justice, however, just in practical terms relative performance is fundamental. Both legitimate investors and criminals practice arbitrage between countries, the former for business advantage, the latter to exploit lax laws or implementation; both are making relative judgments between jurisdictions. These relative judgments are the whole point for taking a global approach to financial regulation. Hence it is precisely a question of ‘who is better than whom’, whether it is attracting legal business or combating tax evasion.

I respond to the points about the US and UK separately below.

2. Bearer shares have strict limits in other OECD countries, and where they exist this has been noted in the respective country reports.

In some OECD countries bearer shares are tightly regulated, as the reviewer notes, but in others, like Britain, they are not. The point here is that most OECD countries have bearer shares, these countries use a variety of means to regulate their use, while some leave them unregulated. This is very different from the choice offered to Panama of abolition or immobilisation. Why are other members of the Global Forum allowed options denied to Panama?

Furthermore, it is a major flaw in the logic to assume that just because countries have laws regulating bearer shares that these laws are necessarily effective. Laws on the books are simply meaningless if they are not implemented, an obvious point that often seems to escape the review process. I discuss this problem below.

3. The use of bearer shares in the UK is rare and does not pose a problem, British CSPs are in any case under an obligation to know beneficial owners’ identities. The Global Witness report is by implication unreliable, and does not deal with bearer shares.

The FATF review provides absolutely no evidence that the use of bearer shares in Britain is in fact rare, beyond an unsubstantiated assurance from the UK authorities. As I noted in the original paper, the FATF report does in fact seem to present one example of UK bearer shares being used to facilitate tax evasion. Unlike the example on the Netherlands, the reviewer presents no statistics on the frequency of UK bearer shares companies, I suspect because this is unknown. Why wouldn’t the lack of publicly available cases of British bearer shares simply be a product of the fact that a large majority of such cases are never detected?

The significance of the Global Witness report is that it points out that, contrary to what the reviewer asserts, the duty on British CSPs to Know Their Customer is not enforced, whether it is bearer share warrants or regular shares. UK Treasury has yet to perform a single audit of CSPs to ensure they are complying. Furthermore, many British CSPs openly claim to be excluded from this measure on the grounds that forming a company is a one-off transaction, rather than an on-going relationship. Here (as elsewhere) the reviewer has simply chosen to ignore or deliberately misinterpret the points being made.

Regarding the insinuation that the Global Witness report is unreliable, here and elsewhere the reviewer seems to think that the only legitimate sources of knowledge on the topic is the OECD, and perhaps the FATF. This close-minded attitude is symptomatic of a tendency to dismiss contrary evidence and inconvenient facts, rather than actually engage in a process of logical argumentation and dialogue with those outside the organisation.

4. The US has a much greater population than Panama, so it’s no surprise that it has more companies. The OECD assesses legal ownership, not beneficial. The FATF has not yet developed effectiveness criteria. It is impossible to say whether Panama has an effective system of beneficial ownership, because it hasn’t been assessed by the FATF or Global Forum. The US has an effective system of information exchange through its tax system.

In relation to US companies the reviewer has again deliberately chosen to ignore the point being made, rather than actually engaging with the issue. The problem is obviously not that the US forms so many companies, but that it forms so many anonymous, untraceable companies. This conclusion is supported by testimony from a wide range of US government agencies before the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, as well as in separate reports by FinCEN, the US Treasury, and the Government Accountability Office. The US received a Non-Compliant rating in its last FATF assessment on Recommendation 33, a report which specifically criticised Delaware, Nevada and Wyoming (see p.231 passim).

The reviewer knows this issue about US shell companies full well, but is sticking to the OECD’s default position of ignoring glaring problems among its powerful member states, despite the unanimity among impartial observers (including US law enforcement) that there is in fact a major problem here. To deny this problem is simply to lose any credibility, and retreat to a position that black is white if the OECD says so.

The FATF has long had an interest in measuring effectiveness, rather than just laws on the books, and this has been in place all through the third round of Mutual Evaluations; once again, the reviewer already knows this but has chosen to misinterpret the point. The FATF is now discussing techniques for better measuring effectiveness and building it into the rating system, but it is simply untrue to say that this is the first time the FATF has considered the issue.

The claim that no one knows how effective the Panamanian system for establishing the ownership of corporations is because it has not been assessed by the Global Forum is again testimony to the solipsistic attitude that evidence is only evidence if it comes from the OECD. In general, the evidence that the reviewer refers to is a product of reading legislation, collecting an ad hoc sample of descriptive statistics, and then soliciting some anecdotes about past instances of tax evasion. There appears to have been no thought given to obvious problems with this approach, such as that rules on the books often have no relation to what goes on in practice, or that the anecdotes are by definition unrepresentative, and thus are an entirely misleading basis for action, because most instances of tax evasion are never detected.

In contrast, in the paper I take evidence from a study I have conducted with two co-authors testing the effectiveness of corporate ownership regulation in 182 countries. This is in the form of a Randomised Controlled Trial, the gold standard of scientific procedure, with a sample size of over 7400. We registered the manual of how we went about the exercise in advance, including designing and pre-testing treatments, double-coding responses, and using blocking techniques to ensure proper randomisation. We subjected the results to various tests to make sure our findings were robust, including Sartori selection tests, multinomal logit and multinomial probit tests, again making all the results and workings public (much of this is online, https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/454625/Oct2012-Global-Shell-Games.Media-Summary.10Oct12.pdf, I am happy to provide the technical appendices). It has been accepted for publication after a rigorous process of double-blind peer review. For people with a genuine interest in scientific process and reliable conclusions, which I would have thought includes the OECD, this is how accurate knowledge is generated. The main result of our study was that OECD countries do a notably worse job of ensuring the availability of company ownership than either Offshore Financial Centres, or developing countries.

I would invite the reviewer to ask any one of the professional economists at the OECD (or anywhere else for that matter) which approach is more likely to generate accurate findings that form a reliable basis for making policy: reading rules and collecting anecdotes, or running a Randomised Controlled Trial.

The FATF, G20 and the OECD itself (Behind the Corporate Veil 2001) have rightly identified beneficial ownership, not legal ownership, as the real issue in combating a wide range of financial crimes, including tax evasion. Of course the Global Forum can adopt whatever standards it likes, but for those with a genuine interest in the substance of the problem, beneficial ownership is the name of the game.

5. The US did not receive unduly lenient treatment from the OECD

I can understand why for public relations purposes the OECD/Global Forum has to maintain the position that the US is held to the same standards with the same consequences as any other member. But I can’t understand why they would expect any independent observer to actually believe this.

Panamá y la Prevención de Delitos Financieros

Participation of Dr. Eduardo Morgan Jr. in the Latin America and the Caribbean Forum on Financial Crime Prevention

January 14-18, 2013

Sponsored by the UK Office and Commonwealth Office – Embassy of the United Kingdom in Panama

Panama is proud of its legal system and of its enforcement in the daily practice, as it represents a barrier to prevent Panama from being used to hide profits from financial crime. The corrupt and the criminal need legal entities and banks to hide the money obtained through their misdeeds.

It is well known that to open a bank account in Panama means going through a burdensome procedure because of the amount of information the banks require. They are so strict that an ambassador of an OECD country complained to the President of the Republic about how difficult it was for companies of his country to use Panamanian banking services.

Not only do we comply with the rules on the control of money laundering but we also apply them in the day-to day practice. Banks will not hesitate to refer to the UAF any detected transaction suspicious of money laundering. We have no scandalous case of corruption involving large sums of money laundering in European banks, and in the United States, such as the highly publicized cases of Mexican Salinas de Gortari, the powerful drug cartels in Mexico, African dictators, Ferdinand Marcos, etc.

What we state about our banks also applies to our legal instruments.

The law of SA was established in 1927 and along with the Shipping Registry, it was the contribution of Panama to the globalization of the economy.  The flexible registration allowed maritime trade to expand by allowing foreigners to own ships and also to allow foreigners as part of the crew. This, together with our Naval Mortgages system and the security of our Public Registry, gave confidence to specialized banks to condition credit to ship owners, under Panamanian registry. At present our Merchant Marine is about 20% of the world fleet and our Public Registry protects billions of dollars in ship mortgages. Panamanian societies perform the same role for international transactions. We copied the laws of U.S. States such as the ones in Florida, New York and Delaware, not for interstate commerce as they did, but for world trade.

CHARACTERISICS OF PANAMANIAN CORPORATIONS

In Panama, the Articles of Incorporation must be made by public deed  registered in the Public Registry; they must contain, necessarily, the name and address of both, the resident agent (lawyer) and at least three Directors. In addition, it is legal obligation for the Panamanian attorney to obtain the identity of whoever is requesting the society; no shelter is provided under professional secrecy in case of an investigation.

Our law allows the company to have shares and bearer shares; it also allows the social pact to contain a ban on the issuance of these. Many banks require this ban from the contracting companies. The government also prohibits them in many regulated activities, as in the case of banking licenses.

Panama’s success rests on the judicial certainty it gives to the users of our societies, created to facilitate businesses to honest businessmen and individuals, not to hide criminals. The wrongdoer does not seek a Panamanian corporation to hide their crimes; for them it is cheaper and safer to use U.S. companies in States where not even the FBI, with all its technical capacity, are able to locate them.

That such is the case has been confirmed by the Attorney General’s Office, our highest authority in criminal matters, certified as follows:

“It is noteworthy that the Panamanian system publicizes who the directors, officers and resident agent of any society are by public record, allowing the authorities to investigate who has the final beneficial ownership of a corporation in Panama even if the shares are issued as bearer shares. An example of this are the cases in which, through the resident agent, we were able to locate the final beneficial owner of these companies, given that the agent has an obligation to “know your customer”, based on the provisions of Executive Order N. 468 of 8 September 1994”.

This certification was issued even before the adoption of Act 2 of February 1, 2011 that further strengthened the obligation of the Resident Agent to know and DOCUMENT the client. An example of this are the well known cases of Central American presidents and politicians, Vladimiro Montesinos, and others like David Murcia Guzman who tried to hide money obtained through acts of  corruption and illegal operations  shielded behind Panamanian corporations.

Let’s see what one of the highest authorities on the subject, Professor Jason Sharman, think of our corporate system in relation to international standards.  The Professor, at the request of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the University of Panama, studied our society system with emphasis on corporate bearer shares; he then compared it to the major OECD members and competitors of Panama in the business of offshore companies. This study was requested to counteract the OECD vicious attacks to our country and the refusal of the Global Forum to give us its approval unless we eliminate, immobilize or deposit our Bearer Shares.

Allow me to read a few paragraphs from Professor Sharman’s study and let me tell you how proud I feel that the serious manner in which we manage our system has been recognized by the brilliant Professor.

Regulating bearer shares is important in ensuring corporate transparency. Yet studies of actual practice strongly indicate that Panamanian Corporate Service Providers are far more compliant with international standards than their counterparts in the United States, the world’s most important financial center and the largest incorporation jurisdiction. A review of the proposed US Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act supports the conclusion that untraceable shell companies are more common in the US than Panama.

In sum, an objective consideration of Panama’s legal and material compliance with beneficial ownership standards indicates that this compliance is superior to that of the UK and US, notwithstanding Panama’s bearer share companies.

More specifically, the applicable standards for the Global Forum in relation to the availability of company ownership information read as follows:

A.1.1: Jurisdictions should ensure that information identifying owners of companies and any bodies corporate is available to their competent authorities. Owners include legal owners, and, in any case where a legal owner acts on behalf of any other person as a nominee or under a similar arrangement, that other person, as well as persons in an ownership chain.

A.1.2: Where jurisdictions permit the issuance of bearer shares they should have appropriate mechanisms in place to allow the owners of such shares to be identified. One possibility among others is a custodial arrangement with a recognized custodian or other similar arrangement to immobilize such shares.

The relevant FATF standard dated February 2012 is the Recommendation 24, which reads in part:

Countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons for money laundering or terrorist financing. Countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. In particular, countries with legal persons that are able to issue bearer shares or bearer share warrants, or which allow nominee shareholders or nominee directors, should take effective measures to ensure that they are not misused for money laundering or terrorist financing (FATF 2012: 22).

In principle, the OECD has specified three routes to obtain beneficial ownership information: through the company registry, via a Corporate Service Provider (CSP), or through strong law enforcement powers (OECD 2001; see also FATF 2009). The latter has been identified as the least promising, in that no matter how sweeping law enforcement agencies’ investigative powers may be, if no beneficial ownership information is collected when a company is established, there is simply nothing there to be seized, especially in the case of foreign customers (OECD 2001: 84-85; FATF 2009: 6).

In few countries, if any, does the registry have the capacity, or even the will to hold and verify identity documentation on the real owner of a given company (StAR 2011: 7, 70). Prominent FATF members, including the United States, have expressed their strong opposition to any requirement whereby registries would have to maintain a record of beneficial ownership (FATF 2009: 7).

By and large it is the third option, the Know Your Customer, the rule for the professional intermediaries that form and maintain companies, the one  regarded as the most promising way to ensure the availability of beneficial ownership information (StAR 2011: 7). In turn, imposing this KYC obligation requires that said CSPs are licensed and regulated. Panama achieves this goal by restricting company formation to lawyers and law firms, and imposing a KYC requirement upon them. Many prominent OECD countries fail to regulate their CSPs, including the United States, and those that do often fail to impose a duty to know the beneficial owner of the companies established by the provider.

As can be seen from the table above, a clear majority of OECD member states (20 of 34) allow bearer shares or bearer share warrants.

From the information provided in the Tax Cooperation 2010 report, few of these countries have immobilized their bearer shares. What restrictions there are on this type of instrument seem to apply only to publicly traded companies. Yet such a restriction misses the point that it is privately-held companies that pose the far greater risk when it comes to tax evasion and other forms of financial crime.

This section makes a brief comparison of Panamanian and US compliance. It finds that although bearer shares in the United States were abolished in 2007, this has not substantively improved the poor performance of the US in relation to OECD and FATF standards on beneficial ownership, which remains markedly inferior to the performance of Panama measured against these same standards.

Why is relevant a comparison with the United States? The United States is the world’s largest economy and financial center, as well as the largest market for illicit drugs. Approximately 2 million corporations of various types are formed in the United States every year (compared with approximately 40,000 annually in Panama), many by foreigners. Given the enormous scale of general economic activity and company formation, to the extent the US does not enforce international standards in this area, the efforts of other countries will be irrelevant. The United States is the most important country in determining whether the international beneficial ownership rules are effective or not.

In 2006 two retired US IRS officials, Michael McDonald and Steven Smith, decided to directly test incorporation requirements in the United States and Panama. McDonald and Smith used a Nevada CSP to form one company in New York and another in Florida, and then opened internet bank accounts for each. They did not have to provide proof of identity, or their Social Security Numbers, and used the name of a pet dog for one of the company officers. They then used a Panamanian CSP to establish a third shell company in Panama with an associated bank account. In contrast to their experience in the United States, in Panama  Smith and McDonald had to provide notarized copies of the picture page of their passports, as well as notarized copies of their driver’s licenses. They then made wire transfers between their three shell company bank accounts, which were in effect untraceable because of the lack of due diligence carried out by the US provider. The ex-IRS officials explicitly noted how lax US standards were in comparison to those in Panama (https://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2007-03-19-money-launder-usat_N.htm).

The example above may be dismissed as a single isolated incident, however, now somewhat dated. Yet there is a considerable volume of more recent and more systematic, evidence that indicates the continuing relevance of this case. The US government itself has produced a great deal of convincing evidence that US shell companies are routinely involved in major financial crime, both at home and abroad (GAO 2006; FinCEN 2007; Levin 2011). This extends to international terrorists (like Viktor Bout), major drug cartels, and corrupt senior officials from the developing world (US Senate 2010). The US routinely receives requests from foreign law enforcement agencies on the beneficial ownership of US corporations, about whom, frequently, the US authorities cannot supply the information (Levin 2011). A recent World Bank/United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) report noted that US corporations are being used for laundering the proceeds of corruption more than in any other countries (StAR 2011: 121).

In general terms, this last study disclosed that in reference to regulations of shell companies:

The United States is by far the worst performer. Out of 27 service providers under US jurisdiction returning a valid response, only 3 said they asked for any form of identity documentation, whereas the others (24) were prepared to form companies without conducting any due diligence whatsoever (StAR 2011: 92).

Where the Stolen Assets Recovery report and various US government publications have been forthright in their criticisms of the United States when it comes to shell companies, the Global Forum has been noticeably more deferential in ignoring or down-playing these key failures. This forgiving attitude is especially apparent with regards to the decision to allow a combined Phase 1 and Phase 2 review of the United States, in sharp contrast to the staggered and conditional progress from Phase 1 to Phase 2 imposed on Panama and many other less powerful countries.

An even larger and more recent study once again supports the conclusion that the standards of corporate regulation in Panama are significantly higher in relation to beneficial ownership than those of the United States (Findley, Nielson and Sharman 2012). The study was conducted with 21 fictitious characters, of obvious acts of corruption, money laundering and risk of financing terrorist activities; these characters requested from CSPs the formation of shell companies. Using these fake identities, the authors made 7,466 approaches to 3,773 CSPs in 182 countries to determine how easy it was to obtain a shell company without having to provide any identification documents, that is, how easy it was to obtain an untraceable shell company in contravention of global standards. The Panamanian CSPs not only required identity documents significantly more often than those contacted in the United States, but complied significantly more than those CSPs in the UK, Australia and Canada.

It is notable that, despite the major differences of scale, the studies by Smith and McDonald, the World Bank/UNODC and Findley, Nielson and Sharman all show a consistent picture whereby international beneficial ownership standards are enforced much more rigorously in Panama than in the United States. Furthermore, the latter two studies indicate that providers in other OECD countries are much more likely to violate international standards by providing untraceable shell companies than those in Panama.

Currently, the United States represents a real danger to the international financial system because of the lax or non-existent regulation of its shell companies.

Note: In 2006 the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative branch of the Congress, made of public knowledge a devastating report under the title “Formations, Minimal Ownership Information is Collected and Available” on juridical persons in 50 States of the U.S.A. United; this report proved to what extent was the lack of control affecting the good name of the country. As a consequence, a project to legislate on the matter was submitted.

SHARMAN SAYS:

“The impetus for the legislation is that US CSPs are unregulated (unlike Panama), and hence under no obligation to collect and file proof of customer identity (again, unlike in Panama). As the Senator (Carl Levin) who submitted legislation had previously noted, American laxity in this domain provides ‘an open invitation for wrongdoers to form entities within the United States’, noting many examples of money launderers, corrupt officials and terrorists furthering their activities with US shell companies. Levin noted how the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands and the Channel Islands all have superior regulation on company beneficial ownership (Levin 2011).

The proposed US legislation would impose a legal duty on states to add a question to annual company renewal forms asking for the name and address of the beneficial owner, as well as a number from a US driver’s license or passport. Non-residents who do not hold a US license or passport would have to supply proof of identity with reference to a foreign passport. Supplying false information would be a felony. The information would be held either by state authorities, or registered agents. As in Panama, there would be no obligation to make this information public, though it would be provided to law enforcement agencies on production of a subpoena. This legislation would mark a welcome advance on current US under-regulation, but it would at best only bring the United States up to the standard that Panama achieved many years ago.

The main contribution of this brief is to offer a comparison of Panamanian law and practice relative to those of OECD competitors, rather than merely presenting another summary of national laws and regulations in isolation. However, it is relevant to briefly relate Panamanian standards to those now existing in the US, and those proposed in the Levin bill. Executive Decree no. 468 of 8 September 1994 created a Know Your Customer duty for Registered Agents (CSPs) of Panamanian corporations, including those with bearer shares. These Registered Agents are publicly identified in the company registry, and are regulated, in that since 1966 only a licensed lawyer or law firm may exercise this role. This obligation was reinforced by Law 2 of 2 February 2011 which creates penalties for Registered Agents who fail to carry out their KYC duties. In practice, Panamanian CSPs establish clients’ identities with reference to copies of government-issued photo identity documents, usually passports. As noted above, from the 2011 StAR report’s solicitation exercise, this system actually works in practice, in that CSPs do in fact carry out their legal KYC obligations. Thus Panama already has a functioning system for establishing the beneficial ownership of companies, including bearer share companies, that is at least as strong as that proposed under the US Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act.

Unfortunately, however, the chances of the US bill passing look small, and so the likelihood of the US meeting Panamanian standards of beneficial ownership regulation are correspondingly remote. The bill has been introduced on three previous occasions without coming close to success. Given the opposition of powerful US corporate interests, and the notable lack of any external pressure from the OECD and the Global Forum for the US to meet international standard in this area, once again the bill’s chances look slight.

In sum, the single most important country in the global financial system, the United States, is clearly inferior to Panama in its regulation of company beneficial ownership information. The fact that the US does not have bearer shares is largely irrelevant, in that anonymous, untraceable shell companies are in practice readily available from American CSPs.

In this context, it is unclear why the failure to abolish or immobilize bearer shares in Panama in and of itself is a problem. As a matter of law, most OECD countries likewise allow bearer shares, and have not immobilized them, including important financial centers like the UK. As a matter of practice, available evidence strongly suggests that Panama is significantly more compliant with international beneficial ownership standards than many OECD countries, and especially the United States. In light of this evidence, it is difficult to take the above-mentioned commitments by the OECD to fairness, consistency and objectivity at face value in its treatment of Panamanian bearer shares.”

Finally, I would like to thank all of you for the invitation to participate in this event. To end this presentation I quote the title of one of my articles:  “Panama, an example to the world”.

(English) FATCA Must GO! And Here’s WHY…

By Andrew Quinlan, December 17, 2012

From CF&P’s Market Center Blog

In the most comprehensive and detailed take-down I’ve yet seen of the Obama administration’s destructive FATCA law, Herman Bouma offers “11 Reasons Why FATCA Must Be Repealed.” Bouma is a Senior Tax Counsel at Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, and an international taxation expert. Here are the 11 arguments he makes along with my own summaries:

  1. The Height of Arrogance. FATCA unilaterally imposes requirements on every foreign financial institution (FFI) in the world.
  2. Blatant Violation of the Golden Rule. The US does to other nations what it would not tolerate in return.
  3. Bullying at the Nation-State Level. With the world’s largest economy, the US realizes it can exert tremendous pressure on foreign banks to comply with the onerous rules.
  4. Disruption of International Relations. Rather than follow appropriate governmental channels, FATCA makes the US a bad neighbor by demanding that the institutions of another nation – which ought to have legal jurisdiction – negotiate directly with the IRS.
  5. Direct Conflict with Many Foreign Laws. FATCA requires many banks to violate local privacy laws, compelling the IRS to enter into intergovernmental agreements (IGA’s) with countries whose privacy laws prohibit compliance. The agreements and the burdens created on the entire world are a highly inefficient way to deal with offshore tax evasion.
  6. Negative Impact on the US Economy. FATCA penalties might lead some number of foreign institutions to stop investing in the US economy.
  7. Immense Burden on Foreign FIs to Comply. The proposed FATCA regulations are 400 pages and the final regulations are unlikely to be any shorter. For a small foreign bank, poring through so many US regulations no doubt written in legalese is an immense burden. As if the burden of understanding the regulations aren’t enough, compliance will come at tremendous cost even if subject to an IGA.
  8. Burden on U.S. Individuals Residing Abroad. FATCA is proving to be a substantial burden on Americans living overseas even though it is not yet in effect. Because of the law, foreign institutions no longer wish to deal with Americans.
  9. Waste of Treasury and IRS Resources. The IRS is using immense resources better spent elsewhere in pursuit of raise very little in revenues.
  10. Efficient and Effective Enforcement Tools Already Exist. The IRS commissioner is claiming success in combating tax evasion using existing tools. And in addition to those placed on foreign financial institutions, FATCA places burdens on the IRS in requiring it to deal with 600,000 FFIs.
  11. The United States Is Not Willing to Provide the Same Information on a Reciprocal Basis. The US is not willing to subject domestic FIs to the same types of reporting burdens as they are foreign FIs. Treasury requires foreign governments to amend their laws if necessary to comply with FATCA, but the US is making no commitment to do the same even under its “reciprocal” agreements.

This is a great list and Bouma goes into much more detail with his research. In our own commentary on FATCA, including my recent op-ed in Forbes, CF&P makes many of the same points, emphasizing

Andrew Quinlan
CF&P President Andrew Quinlan

5-8 in particular. And to add to #9, we like to point out that not only is FATCA a waste of resources, but that the complicated and convoluted tax code creates waste across the board, including in enforcement. Ideally the money spent implementing FATCA should remain in the private sector. Finally, it’s also worth highlighting that the amount of revenue projected to be raised by FATCA over ten years (about $8 billion) would not even fund the government for a single day at today’s spending levels.   
In fact, we can add 3 more points to this superb list:

  • Although the US is not willing at this time to provide reciprocal information, FATCA may lead Treasury to try. The rest of the world is understandably put off by US hypocrisy and demands for information while offering little in return, ut the way to correct this problem is to stop making unreasonable demands on the rest of the world, not to apply the same policies at home. Such policies would compound the negative economic effects of FATCA, and are like responding to accidentally shooting yourself  in the foot by shooting your other foot for balance.
  • Congress did not explicitly authorize Treasury to negotiate IGA’s. Congress misguidedly created FATCA and deserves the blame, but Treasury is going above even its dictates in trying to commit the US to a change in domestic policy to placate understandably upset foreign governments. Treasury has no authority to change the direction of US policy, which currently does not involve sharing the kinds of information with foreign governments that FATCA demands. To do so will saddle US banks with the tremendous compliance costs of FATCA.
  • Revenue projections are probably optimistic. Even the small revenues projected to be raised by FATCA are likely to be overstated. Government projections are notoriously bad, and in this case likely failed to account for the degree to which FFIs would abandon the US market and otherwise find means to avoid the need to comply with the costly law.

Treasury has so far benefited from FATCA’s perceived inevitability. That myth is now punctured. FATCA has been exposed as a failed law, and in light of Edmund Burke’s famous admonition that, “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing,” it’s time to for all liberty loving people to stand up in opposition to fiscal imperialism.

Hong Kong se levanta ante la Amenaza del FATCA

By Andrew Quinlan, December 7th 2012

The chief executive of Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission is warning against allowing US and European fiscal imperialism in Asia.

The boss of Hong Kong’s financial watchdog has called for the authorities to take a greater role in global regulatory dialogue to prevent the US and EU from imposing their rules on region, reports the Global Legal Post.

…He told delegates: ‘If Asia does not get properly involved in the global regulatory agenda, we will find that the US and European rules will be extended to us whether we like it or not.’

The biggest and most costly rule being imposed on the region is FATCA, an effort by the US to conscript foreign banks as agents for the IRS, and to have them pay for the pleasure.

I recently wrote in Forbes that the best course of acti0n is for nations to reject US demands that they relinquish their fiscal sovereignty:

CF&P President Andrew Quinlan urges nations to resist FATCA

As lawmaker fantasy runs aground on the rough shores of reality, the Treasury Department is stuck trying to implement a bad law full of dangerous ambiguity. So poorly conceived was the legislation that Treasury has repeatedly delayed its full implementation. Moreover, realizing that the legislation is largely unenforceable as written, they’ve begun negotiating directly with governments in hopes that they’ll preemptively sign away their fiscal sovereignty in exchange for promises of reciprocity. But Treasury has no authority to make these promises.

Today the Treasury Department is negotiating with more than 50 countries in an effort to implement FATCA… But governments are doing themselves and their financial industries a disservice by contemplating entering into FATCA agreements with the U.S. Backlash against the law is growing, and Treasury is in a race against time to lock it into place before a repeal effort can gain steam.

…As Treasury continues to set new policy behind the backs of Congress, and further drag domestic banks into the FATCA crosshairs, opposition to the law will hopefully grow. But it is necessary for financial institutions, both foreign and domestic, to stand up against the law, and for Congress to step in, rein in the Treasury Department, and undo a mess that they are ultimately responsible for creating.

I also brought a similar message to the 36th Annual Conference on the Caribbean and Central America, where I counseled that “The more everyone believes that there is nothing they can do to stop FATCA, the truer it becomes.” Let’s hope that Hong Kong has taken this message to heart and is joining the growing chorus of opposition to destructive US fiscal imperialism. FATCA will cost the US investment and jobs, but if enough nations stand up and fight then the US might be spared the consequences of its self-destructive agenda.

(English) Global Shell Games: Testing Money Launderers’ and Terrorist Financiers’ Access to Shell Companies

Centre for Governance and Public Policy

by Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson and Jason Sharman

For criminals moving large sums of dirty money internationally, there is no better device than an untraceable shell company. This paper reports the results of an experiment soliciting offers for these prohibited anonymous shell corporations. Our research team impersonated a variety of low- and high-risk customers, including would-be money launderers, corrupt officials, and terrorist financiers when requesting the anonymous companies. Evidence is drawn from more than 7,400 email solicitations to more than 3,700 Corporate Service Providers that make and sell shell companies in 182 countries. The experiment allows us to test whether international rules are actually effective when they mandate that those selling shell companies must collect identity documents from their customers. Shell companies that cannot be traced back to their real owners are one of the most common means for laundering money, giving and receiving bribes, busting sanctions, evading taxes, and financing terrorism.

https://sites.morimor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2012/09/Global-Shell-Games_CGPPcover_Jersey.pdf

(English) Panama’s Corporation System and Bearer Shares in Comparative Perspective

Prof. Jason Sharman

The OECD and the Global Forum have repeatedly stated their commitment to the universal and consistent application of standards on transparency and information exchange according to a fair, transparent and objective process. This commitment applies both to the standards passed into law, and the actual implementation and enforcement of these standards in practice. Few standards on transparency and information exchange are as important as that relating to information on the identity of companies’ beneficial owners.

In this context, it is unclear why the failure to abolish or immobilise bearer shares in Panama in and of itself is a problem. As a matter of law, most OECD countries likewise allow bearer shares, and have not immoblised them, including important financial centres like the UK. As a matter of practice, available evidence strongly suggests that Panama is significantly more compliant with international beneficial ownership standards than many OECD countries, and especially the United States. In light of this evidence, it is difficult to take the above-mentioned commitments by the OECD to fairness, consistency and objectivity at face value in its treatment of Panamanian bearer shares.

https://sites.morimor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2012/09/Sharman_Panama_brief-FDUP.pdf

¿Quién le teme a la OCDE?

(Fragment- Participation of Eduardo Morgan Jr.)

Martes Financiero

Edición N° 744 | September 04, 2012

Central Report

 

WHO’S AFRAID OF THE OECD?-     Tax, Sovereignty and Cooperation

The “rich counties club”, or the OECD ignites the fiscal debate. January 2013, new deadline for reforms.

By Oscar Brown and Melissa Novoa Llorente-  [email protected]

 

The situation. Panama is living a tax revolution which directly impacts the competitiveness of the country.

Eduardo Morgan Jr. took the floor and one minute and eleven seconds was enough to set the Panamanian more radical position against the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). At first, as buzzing bees and then as the sound of a downpour, the intervention was heard in the main meeting hall of the Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Agriculture of Panama (CCIAP) shortly before the end of the forum over the OECD Global project during which the situation of the country in matters of international fiscal transparency was analyzed.

“Have you studied if countries [members of the OECD] have the system Panama has, of lawyers as resident agent, also, that the directors of the company are registered in the Public Registry, and the information, available to the public according to our “Know your Client” legislation”?, Dr. Morgan asked the panel.  The panel was integrated by representative members of the financial service platform of the country; and by an audience of at least 100 people dressed in formal attire.

He went on and asked “Do you know the opinion of the Attorney General about the Panamanian system Public Registry lawyer resident agent, who is required to know the customer and does not allow anyone to hide behind a bearer share to commit knaveries through a corporation without being caught? “. He closed with this statement: “In that regard, Panama does not have any antecedents.”

Outside the meeting Morgan Jr. emphasizes more strongly: “The Government should be aware that the OECD, is not an international organization but a club of rich countries, such as The Economist magazine and Paul Krugman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, 2008 – call it. What they seek is to do away with its competitors. And Panama is one of them.

The fulgent intervention of Morgan Jr. illustrates how the debate about the suggestions of the OECD on more transparent management of the fiscal information, is being expressed